INTRODUCTION
Literature provides a wide spectrum of studies about the role and effects of the interrelations between innovation and processes of change (Antonelli 2003; Geels 2004; McAdam 2004; Ottosson and Björk 2004) . Nonetheless, the solution to those difficulties, in stimulating in practice, local level innovation and knowledge diffusion, particularly in rural area affected by stagnation and rigidities, still remains a problematic task. Even non-marginal rural areas can show static conditions and resistances to innovation with direct consequences in terms of agricultural and rural economy decline, unemployment, natural resources degradation and erosion of quality of life for local communities. These issues derive from the need to concretely empower rural areas, replacing the idea of rural areas as passive recipients of regulations, information, subsidies and other inputs and transforming local agents (farmers, rural entrepreneurs, local administrations, associations, etc.) into active subjects within innovative processes designed to identify renewed economic opportunities on environmentally and socially sustainable bases. Some basilar operative questions ignite the whole discussion:
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CARMELO CANNARELLA AND VALERIA PICCIONI why do static rural areas stay static? Why are some rural territories more responsive and sensitive to innovation and change than others?
Local rural development is assumed to be composed of complex transformation and adjustment processes based on the utilization and management of actual and potential local human, economic and environmental resources creating areaspecific problematic issues (underdevelopment, sustainable or unsustainable development). In this perspective, local development is likely to be a multidimensional process influenced by the variable action of some key dimensions including:
1. Economic factors-firms' structure, firms' productivity, composition of economic activities, firms' competitiveness degree at local, regional, national and international levels, etc.; 2. Technological factors-technology penetration in local products and production processes and management, etc.; 3. Geographical factors-physical and environmental conditions, geoeconomical advantages and disadvantages, etc.; 4. Infrastructural factors-infrastructural quality and quantity (roads, railways, transportation and storage facilities, energy, IT, etc.); 5. Cultural factors-educational levels, mentalities, local histories, social relations, social exclusion and cohesion, etc.; 6. Institutional factors-quality of local administration and public services, presence or proximity to knowledge generators (universities, research centres, etc.) and extension agencies.
On the basis of these territorial patterns, it could be stated that underdevelopment or unsustainable development can result from inadequacies in one or more of these dimensions: when one of this dimension tends to fail, it is necessary to intervene in the other spheres in order to compensate for the collapsed one and severe development crises can occur if all these dimensions collapse simultaneously.
Institutional factors play a critical role because the institutional setting, and the related concepts of institutional strength and institutional thickness, can act as anchor and dynamo stimulating collaborations and synergies to attain common goals to solve development inadequacies. Local institutions play the anchor role if they are able to tie up the (key) agents in the area by creating versatile and intensive collaboration relationships among them and play the generator role if their activities generate replies to development inadequacies and inefficiencies. In this perspective, the capability of a rural area to act as a 'network of networks' (at economic, social and institutional levels), operating within an environmental and cultural context becomes the key factor to support an effective rural development strategy to cope with stagnation and rigidities. Nonetheless, the creation, development, enforcement and management of such territorial networks, require local agents to have prompt operative responses based on more intensive management and better global skills but many territorial agents (firms, farms, local administrations, associations, individuals and other organizations) find mounting difficulties in taking on any extra burden (Arthur 1990; Beer et al. 2003; Curran 1994; Reese 1997) . The creation and strengthening of local rural networks cannot be 'imposed by law', rather requires some prerequisites linked to four basic intrinsic capabilities:
1. Individuation-capability of the network sponsors and supporters to identify relevant agents and appropriate resources to be involved within the system; 2. Involvement-agents' capabilities to be engaged in the network and to engage further agents; 3. Integration-agents' capabilities to be functionally and effectively structured within the network; 4. Cooperation-agents' capabilities to work together and concretely act within the network.
Unfortunately, these capabilities are not always immediately evident in an inert rural area: more often than not they are rather tacit and latent requiring some form of ignition, mainly linked to knowledge and innovation circulation to develop appropriate and adequate skills as a precondition to making these capabilities more explicit (Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004; Rogers 1979; Romney 1989) . The creation of pilot territorial systems within which information and knowledge can flow, be shared, put in action and become more productive is likely to be an essential prerequisite to transforming Knowledge Centres (Small and Medium Enterprises [SMEs] , research centres, local development institutions, innovation supporting agencies, individuals, associations, etc.) into Knowledge Networks through the improvement of the interconnections (edges of the system) among these different local nodes (vertices of the system) of expertise. When these local networks work properly, facilitating knowledge circulation among agents and inducing imitative aggregation phenomena, even simple initiatives promoted with limited financial resources are likely to boost innovation and growth, producing deep impacts in the area influencing methods, practices, techniques and, above all, mentalities. Empirical evidence often confirms that a massive presence of poorly coordinated public intervention subjects, duplications and the creation of a cloud of local offices, agencies and task forces, the lack of or inadequate cooperation among local agents can create mismanaged knowledge and information overflows wasting huge amounts of investments and frequently failing in stimulating local development, innovation-spreading and the solution of inertia and static economic and social conditions (Cannarella and Piccioni 2005a) .
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CARMELO CANNARELLA AND VALERIA PICCIONI Territorial networks are here defined as stable and long term formal/informal systematic relation collaborative webs, more concerned with 'local public goods', among differentiated agents sharing a common information and knowledge source on the base of a more or less conscious agreement. Local public goods differ from other public goods for the limited geographical reach of their benefits conveyed, being a class of public goods connected to regional and national goods whose production requires a cross-area collective action (that can engage neighbouring territories also from different administrative regions) for the presence of cross-area problems and cross-area externalities (Bloise et al. 2002; Champsaur, Roberts and Rosenthal 1975; Milleron 1972; Rege 2004; Thomson 1999) .
Territorial networks can contribute to achieving and managing these local goods influencing local business development and capacity building actions. In the first case, local networks can become strategic tools to support the development and growth of the involved firms/farms and to stimulate a generation of new enterprises around them (production districts). In the second case, they can fuel learning processes, enhancing the skills and expertise of the agents involved in the network, disseminating knowledge and innovation and improving the agents' capabilities to properly select options and choices and make well-informed decisions (Braun et al. 2000; Edwards and Eggers 2004; Hall et al. 2001) .
In the real world, local territorial networks can often show non-linear behaviours, they could not operate as expected and their results can highly differ from the initial goals for the occurrence of perturbations, pathologies and internal/ external pressures. The aim of this article is to identify some theoretical foundations about these abnormalities useful to (a) confirm the connections between inefficient local rural development and dysfunctional territorial networks; (b) develop realistic collaboration networks; (c) strengthen these networks and evaluate their effective impacts and (d ) evaluate and improve the integration capabilities of some focal subjects in the network itself. The identification of some indicators about the more frequent network pathologies can provide concrete contributions to improve the operational dynamics of these networks and the related strategies and tools.
The present article is based on a survey carried out within the research activities of the project 'Development Dynamics and Increases in Competitiveness of Rural Areas' (DICRA) resulting from an agreement between the Research Team on Development and Innovative Processes at the Institute of Chemical Methods (IMC) of the National Research Council of Italy (CNR) and the Municipality of Vitorchiano (a 4000-inhabitants village in the province of Viterbo, about 100 km north of Rome in central Italy). The rural area selected for the project is characterized by traditional agricultural activities, small-scale industries and mining activities being exposed to consistent migration flows from urban centres (Viterbo, 55,000 inhab. distance: 7 km-Rome 4m. inhab. distance: 100 km). In the case study rural area, an analysis of the context highlighted a global weakness of the agents to recognize and receive benefits and opportunities from innovation due to the action of some structural factors such as:
1. Demographic factors-high incidence of elderly population and rapid growing ageing of farmers; 2. Job structure-scarce presence of young farmers; 3. Productive transition-economic and social decline of agriculture; 4. Residential flows-deurbanization and resettlement of rural areas for residential use.
The widespread presence of older farmers and a shared inclination among local agents to act separately are intuitively a source of serious pressures towards routines, static and repetitive conditions which represent an actual and potential cause of opposition to innovation whose role is particularly important in the light of an increasingly competitive and integrated international economic environment. For the purposes of this article, we have investigated about the presence in the area of territorial networks: we have extrapolated five examples of local systems, identified according to the previously cited definition, from a large number of formal/informal networks (or declared as such) deriving from formal programmes, agreements and synergies among public entities (at local, regional, national and EU levels), private partners (SMEs, producers' associations and unions, research centres, etc.) directed to stimulate local development and innovation diffusion. For the present survey, short questionnaires and brief interviews were adopted but frequent informal talks with local people represented the privileged tool to obtain updated independent information about these topics. Of course this approach is likely to be affected by a certain degree of subjectivity but in the identification and organization of those factors at the base of a network's behaviour, individual and collective 'prejudices' can play a not secondary role compared to the more conventional aspects of the issue. Given the characteristics of this survey, a rigorously orthodox statistical approach to the resulting information was not adopted: rather, using the data to articulate some pragmatic and empirical observations.
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CARMELO CANNARELLA AND VALERIA PICCIONI from modeling these networks describing critical phenomena occurring in their creation and development and in improving their performances when acting as engines capable of stimulating and boosting local development. Literature provides a wide range of theoretical models for the architecture and properties of these networks (Albert and Baràbasi 2002; Barrat and Weigt 2000; Bollobàs 1998 Bollobàs , 2001 Bouchaud and Potters 2000; Goh et al. 2002; Kickert 1997; Mantegna and Stanley 2000; Newman 2003) . Even though these models have been developed for the analysis of phenomena distinctive of other disciplines, they however show interesting analogies (and useful interpretative keys) with the present study. In their simplest form, these systems can be defined as a collection of points or vertices (N) which are connected by a variety of lines or edges. Vertices may represent different types of 'locations' and in their applications vertices and edges can outline various types of business relations, infrastructural grids (that is, transport networks or internet web) and human and social interactions. In literature, many studies have been conducted about these systems using the graph theory, which poses many mathematical problems, but includes many relevant considerations about the evaluation of these networks' properties: for instance, defining whether the system is connected or disconnected is one of the most important properties to look at ( Figure 1 ) because the definition of an analytical model to describe and evaluate the connectivity status of the system is essential to understanding whether all the components of the system are adequately involved in the processes, thus determining the diffusion degree, through the edges, of eventual impacts and results among vertices (Barabàsi 2002).
Other crucial interpretative keys can arise while evaluating local vertex properties. For example, the number (k) of edges attached to a vertex (degree of a vertex) or the description of variety of degrees in the network summarized in the degree distribution (K ). This property is extremely important for the description and development of dominant hubs within the network with a large number of paths passing through these hubs (Vertex V2 in Figure 1 ). These dynamics are essentially expressed by 'power laws' which could be synthetically biased in the 'Pareto law': these systems, in fact, are not formed by purely random interrelations but show some 'preferential attachment' degrees according to which new edges tend to attach preferentially to vertices with large degree k. Simulations confirmed that power laws come from networks where there are hubs or vertices with more edges attached than the majority of vertices: to a large extent, the processes leading to the formation of stable connected networks require some type of 'preferential attachment' (Jeong et al. 2003; Vazquez 2003) .
For the present study, the dynamics of some representative sets of models of networks evolving due to aggregation processes and the effects of aggregation of edges in presence of hubs play a critical role also in consideration of the effects, for this analysis, of percolation and Positive Word of Mouth (PWOM)/ Negative Word of Mouth (NWOM) phenomena in enhancing this hub's aggregation power and as partial explanation of an initiative's success/failure as a model for imitative actions (Albert and Barabàsi 2000; Bianconi and Barabàsi 2001; Callaway et al. 2000; Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2002; Herr et al. 1991; Marquis and Filiatrault 2002; Proykova and Staufer 2002; Solomon et al. 2000) . Another crucial interpretative key is provided by the fact that the system behaviour depends to a large extent on the strength of its interactions. Local territorial network agents' size, structure, mission and scope are inadequate to explain their 'properties' while operating within the system. The relationships occurring in the network often drive to some intuitive interpretations: the stronger the interactions, the better the agents are held together and the more energy it takes to disrupt the network assemblage. The connection between interaction strength and agents' rate of escape from the network can become a useful indicator about the inner system cohesion forces contributing to explain many related socioeconomic phenomena. In this way, links' strength indicates not only the quality of socio-economic interactions among networked agents but also the 'wealth' and the volatility of the system environment.
The quantification of the strength in these network links, widely discussed in theory Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2000; Jain and Krishna 2001; Marsden 1990; Townley et al. 2003 ), is extremely difficult to detect in empirical analyses requiring reliable data not always operationally available. Also, the implementation of theoretical models in the real world is a particularly difficult task.
For the purposes of this study, a rate λ of existing link decay and a rate γ of transmutation of strong links into weak connections are introduced throughout distribution.
a scale ranging from one to five. These networks are examined through some empirically observable evidences and symptoms identifying three strength levels, described in Table 1 . Ideas are shared among groups of specialists. Agents are involved in stable discussion groups. The network shows an attitude to increase the number of edges among agents. Medium coordination and agents' magnitude in 'mixing' their activities is substantial.
The network holds melting pot mechanisms in which agents work together showing relevant coordination and significant magnitude in 'mixing' their activities. Ideas, information and knowledge freely flow within the network. All the agents (and the subjects within the agents) contribute to the generation and improve knowledge. Knowledge flows transparently and all the agents (and the subjects within the agents) contribute to the evaluation of the network's results and impacts and optimise adjustment processes related to innovative cycles. The network develops an advanced communication structure.
The passage from simpler integration levels to more advanced ones can drive to the creation of complex knowledge networks whose evolution largely depends on the capability of the agents involved to overcome the conventional limits of technological transfer (Burt 1987) . Technological transfer is in fact mainly based on the dynamics of two operational sides: an innovation (knowledge) supply (that is, research centres) and an innovation (knowledge) demand (that is, enterprises). Even the most evolved models (knowledge loops) are linked to a clear distribution.
separation between these two sides. On the contrary, within a knowledge network, this distinction is likely to be rather fluid. All the agents involved are simultaneously knowledge producers and beneficiaries: knowledge networks do not respond only to the need to generate increases in the volume of knowledge but rather to make agents' knowledge (explicit/tacit) more productive. Therefore, these networks contribute to putting knowledge into concrete action because overall knowledge is tested upon meeting other agents' knowledge and expertise and, thanks to continuous adaptation processes, can be constantly transformed and potentially improved (Barabàsi et al. 2002; Clegg et al. 2005; Greve 2005; Herlocker et al. 2004; Sugawara and Lesser 1998) . For the purpose of the present study, networks are classified according to some parameters:
1 Nature
(a) Formal networks
These networks derive from explicit agreements among agents which clearly define 'the rules of the game', responsibilities, network's aims and scope, agents' roles, etc. Examples of these networks are those driving from regional rural development plans, EU scientific collaborations, etc. For this reason formal networks are likely to be more reliable but rather bureaucratic, having to adhere to norms and regulations, less flexible and malleable in case of changing conditions.
(b) Informal networks
These networks derive from verbal or tacit agreements among agents and for this reason do not have a well-structured architecture and require a tacit reiteration of these unexpressed 'successful' agreements. These networks, not being linked to formal agreements, are less bureaucratic, rather flexible (but in theory weaker than the formal ones) showing on the one hand more volatility but on the other hand a higher degree adjustment in case of changing situations.
Configuration (a) Hierarchical networks
agents having a low substitution degree are public institutions providing financial resources for network creation and development and the achievement of related goals. If an agent shows a high Z level, it is less influential and can easily be replaced and this substitution will scarcely undermine the network's activities and existence.
(b) Peer-to-peer networks
In these networks, all the involved agents show the same substitution degree: Za 1 = Za 2 = Za 3 . In this case, the network's fate is not linked to a dominant agent behaviour. Nonetheless, the network performance and existence can be put at risk by the behaviour of any agent. Another critical factor for the networks' classification is linked to the presence of the earlier mentioned network generators. In these networks, the relation system acts as a skeleton, but for their existence and survival, they always require a certain sort of 'nourishment' which circulates within a parallel 'vascular system'. This parallel system originated from the generator (which doesn't necessarily play the role of hub) and not always coincides with the relation network. Examples of these type of systems are those created on the basis of public (local, regional, national or EU) funding in which these economic resources are the energy for the entire network. Hence, different parallel systems can exist within the same network (economic system, information system, coercion system, etc.). On the basis of these considerations, local networks can show different perspectives, that can be identified as: (a) monodimensional-when these parallel systems coincide in the same network; (b) bidimensional-in the case of two not-coinciding parallel systems within the same network; (c) tridimensional or multidimensional-in the case of three or more notcoinciding parallel systems within the same network.
On the basis of these premises, the characteristics of the present study sample networks are resumed in Table 2 . Local territorial networks are essentially 'anthropological networks' made of agents (organizations) whose links indicate a relationship which is not just a simple function of physical distance among agents (Degenne 1999; Kilduf 2003; Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Watts et al. 2002) . For these graphs, vertices of a network have no position associated with them. Unlike infrastructural webs (transportations, energy grids, water or gas distribution systems), in the case of random anthropological networks, the connections among vertices are made with a very limited reference to notions of relative position of vertices: the random graph of Figure 1 thus has no structure other than its connections distribution.
A B C D E 3 (a local public administration, a research group, an EU-regional information centre for rural development) 4 (a local public administration, a research group, a cooperative, a producers' association)
10 (a local public administration, a research group, a cooperative, a producers' association, 6 oil producers) 7 (2 local public administrations, a regional administration, 2 research institutes, a cooperative, a producers' association) 3 (a research institute, a producers' association, a regional administration) and the positions of its vertices in some real space are not an issue. Yet, random graphs can provide only a partial description of local territorial networks, because, to some extent, even virtual forms shapes and appearances (rather than spatial functions) should be included among the key properties of these networks as indicators of their flexibility and eventual symptoms of the occurring of certain network pathologies. If we include the factors generated by the previous classification model, the conventional graphic representation for networks is unlikely to be suitable for the present analysis because local territorial networks cannot be represented by a collection of points connected by a variety of lines with the involved agents' different 'weight' (linked for example to their variable 'substitution' degrees).
For this reason, we decided to adopt a 'molecular' approach in designing such systems and links driving to evolve the network presented in Figure 1 in some models of 'territorial molecules' as shown in Figure 2 . The visualization of these networks through these molecules can better generalize some typical properties of local systems: for instance, one can say that the distance of the edge in these molecules, according to the parameters described in Table 1 , can sketch out, to some extent, integration, condensation or amalgamation. In addition, the molecular shape can outline the network optimal behaviour and the related modifications in this virtual shape can simplify and exemplify the description of some sub-optimal behaviour, called pathologies, causing fundamental modifications in the characteristics of the system structure (Jensen and Lesser 2002) .
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PATHOLOGIES OF LOCAL TERRITORIAL NETWORKS
Several types of system pathologies have been analysed in detail in the literature. Pathological behaviours in specific limited classes of games emerge from the implementation of game-tree search algorithms (Kaindl 1988; Nau 1983 ) as well as many induction algorithms describe overfitting phenomena that have the tendency to produce models that contain excessive structure (Jensen and Cohen 2001; Oates and Jensen 1997) . In the present article, we refer to peculiar pathologies occurring in multiagent systems: these peculiar pathologies are adjustments made by local agents (in strategies and behaviours) which are beneficial for the single agent but degrade the performance of the overall network. These networks embody continually updated successful tacit/explicit agreements (Boudon 1981 ) based on formal/informal norms and the regularity of imitative reiterations produced by mutual influences and interactions directed to keep the networks disruptive/constructive balance under control to grant the development and survival of the system itself: In more concrete terms, these pathologies tend to violate the explicit/implicit agreements among local agents. The description of these pathologies can derive considering the alterations in a network whose performance is a multiplicative function of agent performance (Daft 2001; Galbraith 1973 ). These networks theoretically obey a fundamental assumption (the local improvement assumption) according to which, if the performance of all other agents remains unchanged, then improvements in local performance by one or more agents will improve the system performance. In a properly functioning network, changes in quality and quantity of information and decision making processes capable of improving the performance of a single agent, can improve the performance of the entire system as well. Some sub-optimal network performances can also emerge from unintentional agent behaviour or external interferences while these pathologies emerge intentionally, violating the local improvement assumption pushing to a network negative performance due to one or more agents' behaviour which produces improvements in local vertices' performances degrading the whole system and damaging the networks' improvement potentials. The most elementary system performance (action) function A can be expressed as a sum of the agents' performances (actions) a or:
As previously mentioned, information and knowledge circulation play a critical role for these networks, thus requiring, for the description of their dynamics, a more articulated model linked to some basic parameters such as the number of agents N, the number s of strategies adopted by the agents acting within the system, the quantity of total information µ available for each agent (this information is introduced in the system thus acting as system information source) and each single value P of total information µ. Information µ thus results from a certain combination of a number of P. The information available in a specific time t is expressed by µ[t] and µ[t] ∈ [0 … P-1]. Each agent performance a is based on the amount of information available and on the adoption of a specific strategy R: the agent performance is thus expressed by a A territorial network interacts with the context within which it operates and the context also expresses more complicated networks of networks. The environment or context E represents a sum of material/non material-tangible/intangible resources e at a given value p.
A matrix J can be introduced to define the interaction among the agents and the context: J[t] ae can describe the relation of an agent in time t with the resources e of the context: among these resources, time and financial assets play a critical role. The system net action A[t] can be given by:
where n R describes the number of agents adopting the strategy R. Agents will tend to adopt the 'best' strategy or the strategy holding a high S R score, useful to optimize the system performance. [t+1] . The system performance is influenced (and complicated) by the fact that the agents hold their own specific gratification scales, connected to specific and personal ideas of 'success' and 'benefit', which are agent specific and subjective. The dynamics of these gratification subjective microscale deeply influence the possibility to ignite the system and its optimal performance on the basis of a widespread collaborative trust as well as the possibility to generate system-positive net actions (impacts) from which further gratifications can be achieved.
In theory, the aim of this network is to mobilize and increase information µ[t] to generate positive impact (A[t] > 0), optimizing not only the choices and actions of each single agent but also those of the system as a whole during the course of time. The progressive gratification deriving from the system can be expressed by the function:
which implies that for each agent, the progressive gratification deriving from the strategy R depends on the actions the agent has adopted on the basis of a certain amount of information µ[t] available and on the system response; such gratification is thus linked to the system potential in producing, in the agent's visions, operational gratifying responses. 'Time' represents a critical factor in knowledge circulation and information production and consequently in the maturation of the system performances and responses. The adoption of an agent's action a µ [ t ] R is essentially influenced by 'experience' or a combination between the results of strategies previously adopted within the network (endogenous factors) and other experiences (exogenous factors). This sort of agent's 'history' is maturing in a time step prior to the generation of information in time t. The agent's actions are thus influenced also by the information available in t -1 or
Agents do not rationally adopt actions from period t -1 to t unless a certain number of results of the previous period are known (experience) with a related gratification/frustration degree. Also, at the same pace, the involved links tend to become obsolete. This mechanism of results/effects emersion contributes to the satisfaction (wealth) of the individuals i who concretely operate in the organizations (agents) involved in the system. Individual wealth W is a critical factor because these agents are not definitively 'impersonal' and the inclusion of 'personal satisfaction' can contribute much to describing the causes and reasons of system distance for an optimal performance. This wealth W can be expressed by:
where, φ[t] describes a certain number of material/immaterial results at a given value p [t] in the time t, C expresses the amount of 'richness' deriving from these results functional to the exploitation of the context's resources related to the modalities the context resources are used by the agents. Increases in wealth W can be described by:
thus driving to:
This equation influences the related gratification mechanism g R [t + 1] for each strategy according to the capability of a
t ] R in generating increases or reductions in individual wealth. The relation between individual wealth and the adopted strategy is expressed by:
where, φ R [t] indicates the quantity of results obtained adopting R during the period t. It is important to note that in the time step t actions a µ [ t ] R are still in progress: they are fully completed in t + 1. From this derives:
The relation between g R [t + 1] and DW R [t + 1,t] can be thus expressed by the equation:
Equation (10) describes the possibility for an agent to opt for a strategy virtually capable of generating the highest satisfaction score. This virtuality is caused by the fact that the success in the adoption of this strategy can be evaluated only at the conclusion of period t. This condition contributes to determining high heterogeneity among the agents in the idea of 'success' of a given strategy. The system dynamics are thus influenced by the classification of the agents' strategies and the modalities through which individuals and agents concerned classify and maximize their wealth.
distribution.
Abnormalities in the dynamics of the above functions can suggest the emergence of system malfunctions caused by eventual pathologies occurring within the network.
DISCUSSION: TYPES AND DYNAMICS OF TERRITORIAL NETWORK PATHOLOGIES Individualism
In individualism, an agent improves its own performance by adversely affecting the context for other agents: by making greater use of the context's resources normally shared by all the network agents. The increased demand provokes a disproportionate reduction in the value of the shared resources for all other agents, with growing transaction costs associated with the increased use. This pathology of multiagent systems is well-known in literature which provides a number of examples of the occurrance of this circumstance termed the 'Tragedy of the Commons' (TOC) (Hardin 1968; Glance and Huberman 1994; Turner 1993; Wellman 1993) . This pathology affects the network through alterations, caused by subjective pushes in one or more agents, focused on W i [t]: here we assume that the individuals concerned (managers) have the power to influence the organization (agent) behaviour. Combining equations (7) and (8), an individual (or a group of individuals) operating within the involved agent, increases his own personal wealth W i [t] , receiving increased benefits, advantages and a sort of 'richness' (∆f i [t]p[t] and ∆C i ) thanks to a greater use of J, pushing E<0 and eventually A<0. On the basis of equation (10), sub-optimal individual behaviour reverberates to the agent performance because it implies an alteration in an agent's
. The agent will thus tend to adopt actions capable of producing increases in individual advantages W i [t] , implying that an optimal system performance (A > 0) is to some extent 'worth' substantially less than a sub-optimal or adverse one (A < 0) altering the choices among the agents' strategies, choosing the strategy with a high S R only in function of some W i [t] increases rather than the optimization of the system performance.
The combination of the results of such strategies and the lack of or inefficiencies in network disincentives and sanctions, stratify experiences pushing the agent towards the adoption of action a µ [ t ] R , which rewards the reiteration of adverse behaviours and definitively alters the agent's S R .
This pathology has been reported in network E: respondents evoked a commonly perceived sense of 'partiality' in the use and distribution of network resources' among other agents. In this case, one agent suffered the effects of particular external pressures and used the system resources supporting privileged distribution.
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CARMELO CANNARELLA AND VALERIA PICCIONI agents selected on the basis of personal beneficial returns, however, altering the functionality of the whole system and highly modifying the impact quality it potentially would have: the network has been used as a 'private property' to develop and strengthen different forms of public relations and benefits.
Crystallization
Crystallization is one of the most frequent pathologies in over-bureaucratized organizations (Corkill and Lander 1998; Hall 1968; Walton 2005) . Formal organizational configurations tend in fact to be static due to the bureaucracy's effects which structure staff and functions to achieve the declared goals. Staff and managers have to cope with living experiences of concrete problems, adaptive attitudes, compromises, etc. driving the agent to achieve a sort of equilibrium between these two pushes and resist excessive unbalances: empirical evidences show that the presence of a gap is to some extent essential for an agent to be flexible enough to cope with changing situations and a continuing evolving scenario (Cannarella and Piccioni 2005b) . Working rigidly to the rules could cripple the agent and its operative mechanisms won't work as expected.
Nonetheless, in certain conditions, some systems reward agents for conforming to prevailing standard procedures, introducing rigidities, reducing flexibility and degrading the system performance. This pathology arises when one agent can improve his performance operating rigidly and other agents can improve their performances by conforming to this agent's beliefs or operational praxes. When crystallization prevails over the whole system, it works as 'social pressure' and 'network externality', in particular when it becomes an incentive to conform. If the local performance associated with a set of beliefs depends partially on the extent to which they are shared by other agents, then the initial state of all agents can determine which belief system prevails. This can lead to lower system performances when rigidities initially characterize one agent's behaviour which can easily cast upon the network and be adopted by all other agents.
Crystallization thus occurs when too rigid a behaviour comes to be commonly shared by all the network agents and its advantages in the short run derive from its capability to contribute to avoiding system sunk costs and mitigating transition problems towards changed conditions. These short-run benefits can however become disadvantages in the long run and the minimization of short-term costs may preclude the maximization of long-term returns. Reliability rather than variability is the fundamental of crystallization and it may stimulate inertia preventing changes from occurring which may involve loss of stability and outcomes too far from the neighbourhood of the status quo.
Network D suffered the effects of crystallization due to the presence of a highly bureaucratized agent (with a very low Z value) which imposed its operational rules on the other agents, consequently 'freezing' the network behaviour.
Rotation
In rotation, the system's agents engage in a series of ultimately circular state transitions (Etcheson 1989; Gleditsch and Niolstad 1990) . These can proceed indefinitely or end in a state with the same performance as the initial state. Rotation usually consumes network resources without producing any relevant corresponding result. In this survey, two types of network rotation have been identified: the former caused by one or more agents' inaction (having low Z value or operating in a peer-to-peer network) and negatively influencing network dynamics generating ping-ponging conditions based on looping behaviours and poor system performances also associated with inefficient time consuming and unchanging processes. In this case, the presence of a 1
, heavily influence the degree with which the neighbouring positive links can be turned into negative (at an increased rate γ) and eventually decay (with increases in λ). The reiteration of the same scarce commitment in the network reverberates within the whole system causing sub-optimal repetitive network performances (A = 0) and according to equation (10), to a g
The latter is characterized by a status in which initial information endlessly cycled among agents through a number of network operative meetings, workshops, etc., never increasing the network knowledge base (Glance and Hogg 1995; Hauser et al. 1993 ). This condition generates looping behaviours based on revolving information cycles. Being
… According to equation (4), this flat behaviour will progressively erode the gratification scale, slowing down the system dynamics driving to a = 0 and A = 0.
In our survey, Network B was affected by Rotation Type I: the network has been embarked in a series of ineffective repetitive actions due to delaying behaviour and time consuming in one agent. Rotation Type II was reported in Network C whose sub-optimal performance and fate was aggravated by the simultaneous effects of other pathologies.
Working against
In working against, one or more agents contrast the regular and optimal network functioning (Bachmann 2001; Cross and Guyer 1980; Monasson 1999 t ] ≤ 0) with negative links among prospective neighbour nodes; consequently the system may exhibit sharp transition phases due to these deteriorating conditions pushing to negative feedback loops between the network's structure and its dynamics (A[t] ≤ 0). This kind of pathology can also affect conflicting departments of the same agent heavily influencing the agent's performance and the system dynamics in which the agent is eventually involved.
Network A highly suffered the effects of the first type of working against: a mounting animosity between two departments of the same agent caused its sub-optimal behaviour which was immediately reflected onto the network which passed through a sharp crisis, sudden increases in γ and λ and a final collapse.
In the second type of working against, one or more agents occupy a predominant role within the network and this pathology can occur in networks characterized by the presence of 'hubs'. Working against Type II, in our survey, reported in Network C, which refers to a condition in which some influential agents enter a network with the role of hub (with a very low Z value), to control information flows and distribution (and the quality of the information shared) among other agents, only to push the entire network into inability, stagnation and inaction because in this case the network was competing with other systems. For this reason, the agent's behaviour can produce a condition of crash and 'blocking': given the characteristics of these hubs and their links, other agents cannot, even though system performance would improve reducing the influence of the hub, modify the network course, create other states or a more flexible system environment. In this case, with µ[t] ≤ 0 and a 1 µ [ t ] ≤ 0 of the dominant hub, other agents, the system unable to produce any gratification, will be forced to a
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In general terms, three territorial local surveyed networks examined here have shown high link decay and transmutation degree (high λ and γ): they have been classified, according to the previously described scheme, at a low 'integration' level while the remaining two networks, showing medium link decay and transmutation degree (medium λ and γ) and medium coordination, presented some features of condensation.
The survey's results have been resumed in Table 3 and the networks' performances during the time course have been displayed in the time charts of Figure 3 .
The empirical evidence emerging from this survey could suggest that weaker networks and peer-to-peer networks are more exposed and sensitive to system pathologies: in the case of hierarchical or bidimensional/multidimensional networks, it is essential to identify those agents with lower Z value and generators and frequently testify their performances verifying their eventual inclination to distribution.
Figure 3 Networks Time Charts
one or more pathologies capable of being transmitted to the entire network. In addition, it could be stated that local static conditions and territorial inertia can result not only from inadequacies in local patterns but also from an inadequate cooperation degree among local agents deriving from inefficient and dysfunctional territorial networks which systematically violate the local improvement assumption. A more 'qualitative' approach has been adopted introducing the concept of network 'impact' defined as positive/negative outcomes created as a result of network activities. This approach can demonstrate that not every territorial network operating in a rural area will provide a positive contribution to agents' economic efficiency and overall local welfare. Territorial networks which operate badly or produce poor performances can waste financial resources and even negatively influence the local context and climate reverberating and percolating their negative effects to other territorial operative dimensions (perverse contagion and propagation), also eroding the possibility to adopt further similar initiatives in the future for the effects of NWOM.
We have here considered the health of a territorial network as any property of the system that could affect the agent's perception of the system and consequently observability by the agent is a key property defining some functions expressing system pathologies essentially observable by the agents. This subjective point of view surely made the present analysis rather unstable due to those variable reactions, in the course of time, occurring within the system related to four macrobehavioral patterns: (a) resistance (the original knowledge context is seen by the agent in contrast with the new one); (b) change (the new knowledge context completely replace-substitution-the old one); (c) incorporation (the renewed context is adapted in the previous one) and (d) transmutation (alteration of the previous knowledge context through the adoption of the renewed one with the creation of a further new original knowledge context). Further investigations are thus required to make the present findings more robust and coherent and more rigorously statistic and scientific conclusions to be extended and generalized. Having these precautions in mind, this article offered the occasion to reflect on the examples of individualism, crystallization, rotation and working against, to be considered as varieties of well known pathologies in social networks describing the violation of the local improvement assumption, their potential capability to create profound effects in inhibiting link formation, to turn positive links into ineffective or negative ones and to enhance non-linear system behaviour and results.
It could be stated that territorial synergic networks showing inner mechanisms capable of guaranteeing the validity of the local improvement assumption should be defined 'reliable' and 'properly constructed' because they cannot exhibit pathological behaviours holding this auto-immune system. The possibility to investigate the quality of the interactions among networked agents and the implementation of the approach described in this article, could provide useful contributions in alerting about actual and potential possibilities of occurring of these system pathologies and preventing a system collapse caused by a deterioration in the link value and in the eventual link losses. Further analyses are directed to identify, investigate and record other forms of pathologies in order to identify a more stable method for providing (a) insights to network dynamics and (b) analytical tools that interpret and synthesize these insights rationally, operating distribution.
within apparently casual contexts. The present combination of these points (and its further analytical improvements) has provided us with a unique view at the type of strategy needed to change specific variables in desired directions within the networks considered, bringing to light some strategic focal points for more strategic interventions which will allow for long-term growth of these territorial systems and substantial improvement in their impacts. 
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